Post-quantum settlement software for Solana.
Every Solana wallet is signed with Ed25519, a classical signature a quantum computer will eventually break. Adversaries can harvest now and decrypt later. SOQ-TEC is software a licensed custodian runs to move value between Solana and the Soqucoin L1 under post-quantum signatures. Soqucoin Labs demonstrated it before mainnet on Solana devnet and the Soqucoin test network only.
- Settlement
- ML-DSA-44
- Networks
- Solana devnet · Soqucoin test network
- Status
- Demonstrated · no live deployment
The thesis
Solana signs with Ed25519. Soqucoin signs with ML-DSA-44. SOQ-TEC is the settlement software between them.
Solana signs with Ed25519, a classical signature. A future quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm recovers an Ed25519 private key from its public key, and every Solana wallet publishes its public key the first time it signs. Soqucoin signs with ML-DSA-44, the NIST FIPS 204 lattice scheme, which has no known quantum attack.
SOQ-TEC is the settlement software that lets a licensed custodian move value between the two chains and hold it under post-quantum signatures on Soqucoin. The custodian operates it under its own licence. Soqucoin Labs builds the software and demonstrates it on test networks.
Quantum Express
Quantum Express settles a cross-chain transfer in under thirty seconds — without waiting for an attestation quorum first.
The trick is physics, not trust. When you burn pSOQ on Solana, the tokens stop existing, a state change no reorganization or validator majority can reverse. Because the burn is irreversible, the operator’s relayer can release SOQ on the L1 immediately. A separate, deferred batch later commits a 3-of-5 ML-DSA-44 (Dilithium) attestation, a Merkle root anchored to both chains, as the post-quantum audit layer.
- Settlement latency
- < 30 s · typically ~10 s
- Attestation
- 3-of-5 ML-DSA-44 · FIPS 204
- Fee (design parameter, set by the operator)
- 0.1% · min 10 SOQ
- Safety
- Circuit breaker · halts on reserve mismatch
The XMSS Revolving Door
A signature you can only use once can’t be replayed, and a key that’s already spent can’t be stolen. The vault is built entirely from WOTS+ — hash-based one-time signatures over Keccak256.
Each withdrawal consumes the key at the current position and the “door” advances by one. When the tree is exhausted, the vault rotates atomically to a fresh tree in a single transaction — there is never a window where custody falls back to a classical key. Value moves WOTS+ → Dilithium and back; Ed25519 only ever pays Solana’s transaction fee, never guards value.
Security rests on hashes, not algebra — the structure Shor’s algorithm has no purchase on.
- Signatures
- WOTS+ · Keccak256, w=16
- Per tree
- One-time keys · auto-rotating
- Custody chain
- WOTS+ → Dilithium · zero classical touch
- Status
- Demonstrated on Solana devnet · atomic rotation in the production design
Demonstration
Demonstration record
Solana devnet · Soqucoin test network
[RECORD] SOQ-TEC Solana lane, demonstrated on Solana devnet and the Soqucoin test network with test tokens.
[RECORD] Quantum Express: pSOQ burned on devnet, SOQ released on the test network by the demonstration relayer.
[RECORD] XMSS Revolving Door: vault opened, deposited, withdrawn twice with WOTS+ signatures, key reuse rejected on-chain.
[RECORD] Circuit breaker: paused and resumed on-chain; a burn attempted while paused was rejected.
[RECORD] The demonstration relayer and its status feed were taken down at the end of the demonstration. Nothing on this page is live.
| Program | Address |
|---|---|
| Gateway program (Quantum Express) | 9pCJxjVF8VTizZ9RZZLTu997y2DafWgUGqYbrNiqPw36 |
| Vault program (XMSS Revolving Door) | 7k4TwwBSZ4a7JA83MgSsqxczU6bpR7qV3uUNGWbTEz8H |
| pSOQ test mint (devnet) | 7TCU5SnLR7ARRAd8aUdoAFgw9zvCvzwdphm7TjUT6s46 |
The explorer belongs to no one here. Open any address and check it yourself.
Security model
SOQ-TEC’s post-quantum claim is forward-looking: when a quantum computer can run Shor’s algorithm, today’s Ed25519 and ECDSA signatures become forgeable — and every classical bridge with them. The attestation and the vault are built on lattice and hash cryptography that has no known quantum attack. We don’t claim it would have stopped past bridge exploits — those were implementation bugs, and correct, audited code prevents that class.
- 01
Burn irreversibility
Optimistic settlement rests on a state change no reorg can undo — not on trusting a quorum first.
- 02
3-of-5 Dilithium attestation
Forging an attestation needs three independent ML-DSA-44 keys — signatures quantum computers cannot recover.
- 03
Hash-based vault
Custody is WOTS+ one-time keys, then Dilithium. Value never rests on Ed25519.
- 04
Circuit breaker
Releases halt automatically if total burned and total released stop reconciling, pending multisig review.
Build on it
The gateway program, the XMSS vault program, and the relayer are open source under MIT. Read the architecture and the on-chain programs.